Chris Heitzig • Publications
Reports/policy briefs
Joint with Mma Amara Ekeruche and Lemma W. Senbet
Focusing on African cities, this chapter addresses these challenges at the intersection between informality in housing and employment, and climate change adaptation. Following a brief review of the economic and political forces perpetuating the informal city, the chapter presents a discussion of the threats that advancing climate change poses for communities of people living and working informally. A framework is articulated that illustrates the links between climate change threats and informality while also delineating the necessary interventions to address these threats. In doing so, the framework emphasizes that political economy (dis)incentives and limited state capacity impede countries in moving from statements of intent to implementing new policies that would create a more equitable and sustainable city for all.
Joint with Louise Fox, Danielle Resnick, Aba Amissah Quainoo, and Susan Nartey
Focusing on African cities, this chapter addresses these challenges at the intersection between informality in housing and employment, and climate change adaptation. Following a brief review of the economic and political forces perpetuating the informal city, the chapter presents a discussion of the threats that advancing climate change poses for communities of people living and working informally. A framework is articulated that illustrates the links between climate change threats and informality while also delineating the necessary interventions to address these threats. In doing so, the framework emphasizes that political economy (dis)incentives and limited state capacity impede countries in moving from statements of intent to implementing new policies that would create a more equitable and sustainable city for all.
Joint with Kathrin Berensmann, Mma Amara Ekeruche, Aloysius Ordu, and Lemma W. Senbet
The debt situation in many low-income countries (LICs) following the COVID-19 pandemic has deteriorated considerably. While many LICs had participated in the G20’s Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI) by April 2022, only three countries have taken part in the Common Framework for Debt Treatment beyond DSSI. To better operationalise the Common Framework, the G20 should incentivise private and public creditor participation including those of Non-Paris Club members. In addition, G20 members should encourage the application of the comparability of treatment clause and urge multilateral creditors to participate in the debt restructuring process. The G20 should encourage full disclosure of debt among creditors by promoting the OECD Debt Transparency Initiative and by adopting the G20 Operational Guidelines. Moreover, the G20 should support local capacity building for public financial management in LICs and should promote that debt treatment under the Common Framework is subject to scaling up sustainable investments in debtor countries. Finally, the G20 should use its weight in the managing boards of the international financial institutions to push IMF-WB debt sustainability analyses to better include sustainability criteria.
[4] “How currency sanctions on Russia could disrupt trade with Africa.” 2022. The Brookings Institution.
Joint with Aloysius Ordu, and Leo Holtz
This paper uses a recently released dataset that measures the currency of trade invoicing to estimate the share of African trade that will be disrupted—that is, current financing pathways rendered inexecutable—due to the sanctions levied by the U.S. and eurozone countries on Russia (we call these effects “disruptions,” rather than losses, because they have not yet been realized, and it is uncertain how trade partners in Russia and Africa will respond to reduced financing options). We find that currency sanctions alone have the potential to disrupt 1.8 percent of all African trade and, for some countries, upwards of 5 percent of trade revenue. We also argue that for a host of political, economic, and financial reasons, these figures are a lower bound for potential disruptions. These figures, though not large enough to prioritize, are too large to dismiss during a difficult financial period for many African governments. We also surmise about the knock-on effects of the sanctions, including the potential for escalating food insecurity, change in commodity prices, demand for alternative currencies, and the future of African trade relations.
Joint with Landry Signé
Africa, enabled by rapid technological change and demographic shifts, is primed for a major socioeconomic and structural revolution. This report analyzes the major trends driving this change, along with the opportunities and challenges stemming from it. Africa has the fastest-growing population in the world. In fact, one in four global citizens will be African by 2050. This growing population is projected to become increasingly concentrated in urban areas as Africa continues to experience a rise in the influence of and opportunities in its major cities. This young, growing workforce will be complemented by a rapidly expanding middle class with trillions of dollars in buying power in the coming decades. This report argues that, if harnessed successfully, these trends represent a significant opportunity for African countries and the U.S. to shape a transformation on the continent that ensures prosperity and equitable growth for all.
Joint with Mma Amara Ekeruche, Oreoluwa Adenuga, Oludele Folarin, and Kashema Bahago
This paper makes a case for linking Nigria's debt finance to climate adaptation and mitigation programmes as well as other development priorities. It further shows the viability of debt-for-development swaps using a scenario analysis. Three scenarios are presented including the baseline scenario covering all ODA-eligible Paris Club debt and performing Eurobonds and all multilaterla concessional debt: and the pessimistic scenario covering only ODA-eligible Pars Club debt. The paper finds that as much as $3.7 billion can be saved in the baseline scenario. If the entirety of the eligible debt were to be swapped under the baseline scenario, it would create an average of nearly $300 million of budgetary resources per year between 2022-2028. The paper also traced participating in debt-for-nature swaps and foudn that debt-for-nature swaps increased funding for the environment marginally in three out of the five countries - Poland, Bulgaria, and Jamaica. Spending for the other two countries decreased. With these insights, in Nigeria, projects such as the Deep Decarbonisation PAthways Project, could be funded with savings from the debt swap would include structures and accountability mechanisms to ensure that the government remains committed to climate adaptation and mitigation as contained in both the National Development Planning, 2021-2025 and the Updated Nigeria National Determined Conditions.
Joint with Aloysius Ordu and Lemma W. Senbet
This paper utilizes new data to study the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on debt sustainability and vulnerability in sub-Saharan Africa and sheds light on the channels through which these impacts have taken place. We find that debt levels have risen substantially in sub-Saharan Africa since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. We utilize IMF projections as a comparison to analyze the impacts on the pandemic on debt levels and how they covary with key determinants of growth and fiscal space.
[8] "Urbanization in the Western Balkans and Croatia: Rising to the many challenges." 2019. In: “Western Balkans and Croatia Urbanization and Territorial Review,” World Bank Group.
Joint with Mathilde Lebrand, Paula Restrepo Cadavid, and Maria Soppelsa
This chapter reviews the progress of urbanization in the Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia) and Croatia and describes its links with economic development. It compares cities in the Western Balkans and Croatia with others around the world to identify any unique features of urbanization in the study area. Urbanization in the Western Balkans and Croatia seems to have delivered economic gains similar to those in countries globally, but performance in the region still trails that of Western Europe (the productivity frontier). Cities in the study area except Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina also seem to be performing well relative to similar countries in ECA and in the world. However, a more granular analysis reveals that even as the average city in the Western Balkans and Croatia is doing well, large and capital cities are not contributing much to economic growth. In fact, they are underperforming such cities in similar ECA countries. And while being a large city was advantageous for economic growth in ECA countries in prosperous times, that was less true for large cities in the study area. Since 2009 large and capital cities in these countries seem to be trailing rather than leading national economic growth. Understanding the reasons for the underperformance of capital and large cities and how their potential can be unleashed will be critical if these countries are to reap the full benefits of urbanization. Finally, while globally a declining urban population is often linked to economic decline, that is apparently not the case in Western Balkan and Croatian cities. In fact, many shrinking cities are performing as well as or better than growing ones, particularly since the global financial crisis.
Blogs/Editorial
[1] “Africa: Growth beyond deindustrialisation?” 2023. International Growth Centre.
Joint with Richard Newfarmer
Africa’s unique shift towards services rather than manufacturing in its economic transformation, raises the question of whether services can drive productivity growth—and at a rate comparable to manufacturing. Across the continent, the role of services, especially in high-skilled tradable sectors, is crucial in boosting jobs and productivity to drive economic growth. As African policymakers design their policies to promote economic growth and transformation, they need to be mindful that focusing solely on industrial policy promoting manufacturing would miss the opportunity to secure productivity gains in other sectors of which services are perhaps the most important. These include tourism, business services, financial services, telecommunications, and e-commerce. In addition, looking for ways to expand commercial agriculture into high value-added crops, particularly for export, offers obvious growth opportunities in land rich Africa. Finally, even sectors once thought relatively impervious to technological change, such as construction and transport, can play an important role in absorbing labour and driving productivity growth.
Joint with Richard Newfarmer
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has generated enormous costs. Most have been borne by brave Ukrainian citizens and the unfortunate Russian soldiers ordered to fight. But the whole world has experienced significant collateral damage: further spikes in energy costs and food prices, and a possible global recession. Nowhere has that indirect damage been greater than for those already on the brink of poverty, particularly in Africa. The food price index produced by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations hit a record high in March, and fertilizer prices also have surged. Efforts by national policymakers to improve domestic food security, such as India’s recent ban on wheat exports, have made matters worse. The war’s ripple effects threaten to damage not only near-term production but also future harvests after the fighting in Ukraine ceases. Millions more Africans could thus soon face poverty, hunger, or both.